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Abstract: Dynamic competitive models of industry evolution predict higher variability 
of firm value over time and lower variability of firm activity over time in  industries 
where sunk entry costs are higher.  These predictions have done well empirically.  Here 
we extend the theory to allow an additional category of sunk costs---depreciation---and 
argue that this generates countervailing effects.  We test this assertion empirically and 
find the results are consistent with the theory.   
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  There  is  a  substantial  literature  on  competitive  industry  dynamics.    This  literature 
includes both theoretical and empirical contributions, and these complement each other nicely.
1  
Two robust predictions of the theory are: (1) a positive relationship between sunk entry costs 
and the intertemporal variability of firm value, and (2) a negative relationship  between sunk 
entry costs and the intertemporal variability of the number of firms.  The first prediction arises 
from natural equilibrium conditions requiring that firm values be at most equal to entry costs 
(because higher values provoke entry) and at least equal to scrap value (because lower values 
provoke exit).   This suggests that the range of firm value over time should be approximately 
equal to the difference between the entry cost and the scrap value, which in turn  is a natural 
definition of sunk entry cost.  It follows almost immediately that the range of firm value over 
time is equal to, and hence increasing in, the sunk entry cost.   The second prediction arises 
because higher sunk entry costs make entry and exit more expensive and so tend to reduce the 
variability in the number of active firms over time.  Although detailed data on sunk entry costs 
do not seem to be available, these predictions have been tested using various proxies and found 
to be consistent with the data.                                                                              
This paper extends the analysis by introducing depreciation, a category of sunk cost that 
has not received much attention  in this  corner of the  literature.
2  It turns out that sunk 
                                                             
1 Examples of empirical work include Deutsch (1984), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989), Geroski, 
Gilbert, and Jacquemin (1990), Geroski and Schwalbach (1991), Siegfried and Evans (1992,1994), 
Audretsch (1995), Lambson and Jensen (1995,1998), Gschwandtner and Lambson (2002,2006), Disney, 
Haskel, and Heden (2003), and many others.  Examples of theoretical work include Jovanovic (1982), 
Ericson and Pakes (1989), Dixit (1989), Sutton (1991), Lambson (1991,1992), Hopenhayn (1992), Cabral 
(1995), Caballero and Pindyck (1996), and many others.   
2 There are, of course, exceptions.  See, for example, Kessides (1990), Farinas and Ruano (2005), and Vivek 
(2007).   depreciation costs behave differently than sunk entry costs; indeed, they dampen the effects of 
the latter.  For intuition, consider the extreme case in which firms’ assets completely depreciate 
each  time  period.    Then  when  entry  and  exit  decisions  are  made  at  the  beginning  of  the 
subsequent period, the active firms have no advantage over potential entrants.  In equilibrium, 
entry and exit maintain firm value equal to the entry cost.  Thus, in contrast to high sunk entry 
costs,  which  are  associated  with  high  intertemporal  variability  of  firm  value  and  low 
intertemporal variability of the number of firms, high depreciation generates low intertemporal 
variability of firm value and high intertemporal variability of the number of active firms. 
Section 2 spells out the theoretical arguments upon which these empirical implications 
rest.   Section 3 describes the measurement of depreciation.  It gathers market-based (not 
accounting-based) estimates of depreciation rates for various capital inputs from the existing 
literature  and  explains  how  we  incorporate  those  into  the  subsequent  empirical  analysis.  
Section  4  presents  the  empirical  results,  which  are  consistent  with  the  theory.    Section  5 
concludes.   
2. Entry costs and depreciation rates: theory   
2a. Value of firms 
    In the absence of depreciation, the theoretical result that the variability of firm value 
over time is positively correlated with sunk entry cost is robust in that very little structure is 
required to demonstrate it.  Specifically, let ξ be the cost of creating a firm and let χ be the value 
of scrapping a firm.  Natural equilibrium conditions require that firm value, V, be bounded above 
by ξ (because higher values provoke entry and thus cannot persist) and bounded below by χ 
(because lower values provoke exit and thus cannot persist).  If market conditions are variable enough and the observation time long enough for V to visit each end of its support, then the 
range of V over time is ξ – χ.  Since this is a plausible definition of sunk entry cost, the range of 
firm value is identical to, and hence positively correlated with, the sunk entry cost.
3   
  Depreciation, the loss of value sunk through wear and tear on or consumption of capital 
inputs, differs from the loss of value that is sunk when productive capacity is newly committed 
to an industry.  Let ξi denote the number of units of input i required to enter an industry, where 
the units of each input have been normalized to have a price of one.  Further suppose that each 
period a fraction λi of input i fails and must be replaced in order for production to continue.  
Instead of continuing, the firm may be scrapped and the scrap value of each input, χi, may be 
recouped.  Potential entrants compare the cost of entry, ξ = ∑iξi, with their value if they enter.   
Thus entry has a tendency to place an upper bound on a firm’s value that is equal to the entry 
cost.  Similarly, active firms compare their value if they remain active with their value if they 
exit.  The latter includes the avoidance of the depreciation costs that must be paid to continue 
activity---namely ∑iλiξi ---as well as the scrap value of the firm, χ =∑iχi.  Thus a firm’s value cannot 
dip below ∑iλiξi + ∑iχi without provoking exit.  This suggests that firm value over time is trapped 
between ∑iξi above and ∑iλiξi + ∑iχi below.  If the market conditions are variable enough and the 
observation time is long enough for firm value to visit the extreme points of its support, then 
the range of firm value over time is  
(2.1)        R = *∑iξi - ∑iχi] - ∑iλiξi.   
Inspection reveals that the range of firm value depends positively on sunk entry costs as before, 
but depends negatively on sunk depreciation costs.   
                                                             
3 See Lambson (1992).  The empirical importance of sunk entry costs in various contexts has been studied 
by Asplund (2000), Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and others.   2b. Number of active firms 
  Economic intuition suggests that higher sunk entry costs, by raising the cost of entry and 
exit, will tend to reduce the level of such activities.  Although this result is not as straightforward 
as the effects of sunk costs on the variability of firm value, it is broadly true.   Lambson (1992) 
showed that if the sunk entry cost, ∑iξi – ∑iχi , is increased either by increasing the entry cost ∑iξi 
or decreasing the scrap value ∑iχi then the range of the number of active firms is negatively 
related to sunk entry costs.  A similar argument with depreciation establishes that the range of 
the number of active firms is negatively related to ∑iξi – (∑i λi ξi + ∑i χi) when it is increased either 
by increasing ∑iξi with (∑iλiξi + ∑iχi) fixed or by decreasing (∑iλiξi + ∑iχi) with ∑iξi fixed.  This doesn’t 
imply that the range of the number of active firms is decreasing in sunk entry costs, although it 
is suggestive.  It does imply, however, that the range of the number of active firms is increasing 
in sunk depreciation costs.   
  To illustrate, suppose there is only one input required for entry, and there are two 
market conditions, one with high demand and another with low demand.  The distribution is 
i.i.d. with ρ the probability of the high demand condition.  Suppose that changes in demand are 
large,  so  that  whenever  the  market  condition  improves  there  is  entry  and  whenever  it 
deteriorates there is exit.  Then the indifference relations for entry and exit are: 
(2.2)    π (y
h,h) + β*ρξ + (1-ρ)χ+ = ξ 
(2.3)    π (y
l,l) – λξ + β*ρξ + (1-ρ)χ+ = χ 
where β is the discount factor, y
h is the number of active firms when demand is high, y
l is the 
number of active firms when demand is low, and π is the one-period profit of an active firm.  
Subtracting the second equation from the first yields: (2.4)    π(y
h,h) - π (y
l,l) = (ξ – χ) - λξ. 
Equation  (2.4)  exhibits  a  range  of  firm  profits  that is  increasing  in  the  sunk  entry  cost  and 
decreasing in the sunk depreciation costs.  Now if, for example, π(y,m) = (αm – y) then (2.4) 
becomes: 
(2.5)     (y
h – y
l) = (αh – αl) - (ξ – χ) + λξ 
so the range of the number of firms is decreasing in the sunk entry cost and increasing in the 
sunk depreciation costs.   
3. Measuring depreciation 
  Jorgensen (1996) and Fraumeni (1997) discuss the empirical literature on depreciation.  
We  share  with  them  the  view  that  economically  relevant  measures  of  depreciation  are 
determined by the workings of resale markets for capital assets. Such measures are more likely 
to be economically relevant than, for example, accounting measures.   
We require two different measures of depreciation: a firm-level measure to test the 
implications of Section 2a and an industry-level measure to test the implications of Section 2b.  
To construct either measure requires an estimate of depreciation for each capital input.  We 
have taken these from Hulten and Wykoff (1981) as summarized by Jorgenson (1996) Table II.  
Hulten and Wykoff apply the Box–Cox power transformation to used asset prices in order to 
estimate  the  rate  and  form  of  economic  depreciation.  This  allows  them  to  statistically 
discriminate between various patterns of depreciation (most importantly, geometric, linear and 
‘one-hoss-shay’ depreciation patterns).  They find that the observed depreciation patterns are 
approximately geometric. In a later paper Hulten and Wykoff (1996) revised and extended these 
measures to include the effect of obsolescence, defined as  the decline in price resulting from the introduction of new vintages of capital. As a result the revised rates are generally somewhat 
higher  than  the  initial  Hulten-Wykoff  depreciation  rates.  These  two  sets  of  depreciation 
estimates will be referred to as HW1 and HW2, respectively.  Finally, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) published its own estimates of depreciation rates for use in the National Income 
and Product Accounts.  The estimates employed in the national accounts differ from the other 
two depreciation measures in that they incorporate information about lifetimes and salvage 
values  of  assets  and  accounting  formulas  permitted  for  tax  purposes.  The  economic 
depreciation rates for nonresidential structures estimated by Hulten and Wykoff are much lower 
than those employed in the U.S. national accounts. The BEA depreciation rates can be found, for 
example, in Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).  More recent but not very different depreciation 
rates can be found in Fraumeni (1997). Despite the differences in construction, our results using 
the BEA depreciation rates do not differ significantly from the results using the two Hulten-
Wykoff estimates.  
We  constructed  the  firm-level  estimate  of  depreciation  as  a  weighted  sum  of  the 
depreciation rates of the capital inputs used by the firm.  The weights are estimates of the firm’s 
expenditures for the respective capital inputs.  Specifically, the depreciation index for firm f in 
industry F is  
  (3.1)    Λf = ∑I λ i PiF (Sf/SF ),                                                                                                
where Sf  is firm f’s average sales over time,  i is the depreciation rate of input i, PiF is the 
aggregate expenditure on input i in industry F, and SF is industry F’s average sales over time.  For 
the industry’s expenditures on input i, PiF, we used the capital flows table constructed by the 
Industry Economics Division (IED) of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States 
Department of Commerce. The capital flows table is a supplement to the benchmark input-output accounts and it shows purchases of new structures, equipment and software by industry.  
Specifically, the capital flows table lists the capital inputs used in each industry; these were 
multiplied  by  the  depreciation  rates  for  the  respective  industries in  which  the  inputs  were 
produced and summed.   
We used similar methods to construct our depreciation measures for the analysis of the 
intertemporal number of firms in an industry.  In contrast to the analysis of intemporal firm 
value, where each observation corresponds to a firm, here an observation corresponds to an 
industry.  Of course, defining industries is seldom without difficulties.  We assigned firms to 
industries  according  to  SIC  (NAICS)  codes  at  the  2-4  digit  level.    It  is  well  known  that  this 
approach is not perfect—for example, since many of the firms are diversified across product 
lines they might not be well described by a single SIC code—but we have no compelling reason 
to believe that these shortcomings introduce any biases.  If expenditures per unit of output 
(sales) is interpreted as a cost of capacity, then  
(3.2)    ΛF = ∑I λ i PiF /SF               
is interpretable as the depreciation rate of capacity in industry F.   
  Finally,  we emphasize  again  that  these  depreciation  measures  are  based  on  market 
prices.  These are more likely to reflect the economically relevant depreciation rates than are 
estimates  that  follow  accounting  rules  that  are  not  necessarily  correlated  with  economic 
activity. Furthermore, the functional forms used to determine the depreciation rates are very 
flexible and therefore much more probable to approximate the real pattern of depreciation than 
typical accounting rules. 
 4. Entry costs and depreciation rates: evidence 
4a. Value of firms 
  The regressions in this subsection test the proposition from Section 2a that the range of 
firm value depends negatively on the rate of depreciation of its capital inputs.  We also control 
for the size of the sunk entry costs, as is suggested by the existing literature.  The database used 
for these purposes contains information on 162 companies.  All of them are publicly traded 
manufacturing companies in the United States observed between 1950 and 2001. The sample is 
comprised of those firms among the largest 500 companies (in terms of sales) as of 1950 for 
which  a  complete  time  series  on  profits  for  the  analyzed  period  existed.    There  is  obvious 
selection bias in the firms that survive, but it is irrelevant because the theory makes predictions 
about  surviving  firms.      Most  of  the  database  was  compiled  from  Standard  and  Poor’s 
Compustat.  Gaps—mostly a problem in the early years—were filled from Moody’s Industrial 
Manual.  
  We regress firm value variability on measures of sunk depreciation costs and sunk entry 
costs.  As is commonly done, we measure firm value as the sum of stock market capitalization 
and total liabilities.  Stock market capitalization is calculated as the year-end closing price of 
common shares times the number of common shares outstanding.  The closing price is the 
closing trade price for shares traded on a national stock exchange and the closing bid price for 
shares trading over-the-counter.  We measured intertemporal variability in two usual ways: 
range and variance.  Although theory favors range as the appropriate measure, variance is less 
sensitive to data problems that result in outliers.  It turns out that one may remain agnostic as to which is the better measure: the regressions with range and the regressions with variance 
yield similar results.   
  The results of these regressions are in Appendix A.  One star denotes significance at the 
10% level or better, two stars denote significance at the 5% level or better, and three stars 
denote significance at the 1% level or better.  The equations include both a sunk entry cost 
proxy as in prior studies (namely, investment in property, plants and equipment) and a sunk 
depreciation cost.  Various dependent variables are considered: range, variance, log of range, 
log of variance.  The coefficient of the sunk entry cost proxy is positive, as predicted.   The 
coefficient of the sunk depreciation cost is negative, as predicted.  Concerned that fifty years 
might be too long to expect a firm to remain similar, we also divided the 50 years of the sample 
into  ten  year  subsamples.  Our  conclusions  were  unaffected.    In  addition  to  what  we  have 
reported, we tried several other robustness checks, including the number of employees, capital 
expenditures, capital intensiveness (as measured by the capital-labor ratio), and new capital 
expenditures.  None of these variants had any significant effect on our results.   
4b. Number of firms 
To explore the relationship between the variability of firm activity and sunk entry and 
depreciation costs, we used annual data from the US Census Bureau. With sponsorship from the 
US Small Business Administration (SBA), the Census Bureau collects data on entry and exit by industry for the United States as a whole and for each state.
4 This database contains information 
about entry, exit, and employment from 1990-2000 for each included industry.
5   
  The theory asserts that the range of the number of a ctive firms over time should be  
positively related to  sunk depreciation costs.   (The effect of sunk entry costs is murkier , and 
indeed the entry cost proxy does not achieve a statistically significant coefficient.)  Our data do 
not include the number of firms.  They do  include annual data on entry and exit.  Fortunately, 
this is adequate to calculate the range of the number of firms because, assuming there is 
enough variability over time and a long enough observation period to observe the extremes, the 
range of the number of firms is 
     R(y) = maxτ {yo +   [nt – xt]} – minτ {yo +  [nt – xt]} 
= maxτ {   [nt – xt]} – minτ {  [nt – xt]}. 
Since the initial number of firms, yo, cancels, not observing it poses no problem.   
  The results are reported in Appendix B.  The various specifications all exhibit significant 
coefficients of the predicted sign for depreciation.    
5. Concluding Remarks 
  The  field  of  industrial  organization  began  as  the  study  of  imperfect  competition.  
Differences in profit rates across industries, a very well documented phenomenon, were taken 
to  be  evidence  that  competition  was  imperfect.      However,  differing  profit  rates  across 
                                                             
4 These data are available at: http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/data.html. 
5 More specific information is at: http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb2.htm#godyn1. industries are consistent with perfect competition, even in the long run.  (See Lambson (1992).) 
Since maximizing average profits is not the firms’ objective, the market provides no mechanism 
to  equalize  them.    Rather,  if  firms  attempt  to  maximize  the  expected  present  value  of 
investments, then it is the value of a marginal dollar of investment that will tend to equalize 
across  investments.    Under  these  circumstances,  it  seems  likely  that  any  robust  empirical 
implications will be inherently dynamic.  This paper has focused on a few of these dynamic 
implications, showing them to be consistent with the data.   
 
 
   Appendix A 
 
A.1: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the range of firm values 




 (0.803) *** 
    0.21 
(0.099)** 
0.12  162 
8.74 
(0.185)*** 
  -3.43 
(0.812)*** 
  0.21 
(0.099)** 
0.12  162 
8.69 
(0.184)*** 




0.14  162 
Note: HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various 
data sources.  Entry refers to Investment in property plant and equipment. Sunk is the average 
per firm over the period 1950-2001. 
A.2: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the variance of firm values 




 (1.61) *** 
    0.42 
(0.198)** 
0.11  162 
14.96 
(0.37)*** 
  -6.71 
(1.63)*** 
  0.42 
(0.198)** 
0.11  162 
14.88 
(0.370)*** 




0.12  162 
Note: HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various 
data sources.  Entry refers to Investment in property plant and equipment. Sunk is the average 
per firm over the period 1950-2001. 
 A.3: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the range of firm values within decades 




 (0.07) *** 
    0.803 
(0.088)*** 
0.52  803 
6.197 
(0.586)*** 
  -0.291 
(0.071)*** 
  0.806 
(0.891)*** 
0.52  803 
6.121 
(0.572)*** 




0.52  803 
Note: HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various 
data sources.  Entry refers to Investment in property plant and equipment. Entryk is the average 
per firm over the decades. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors cluster corrected 
by industry.   
A4: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the variance of firm values within decades 




 (0.142) *** 
    1.559 
(0.178)*** 
0.52  803 
10.51 
(1.186)*** 
  -0.604 
(0.143)*** 
  1.564 
(0.180)*** 
0.52  803 
10.370 
(1.156)*** 




0.52  803 
Note:  HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various 
data sources.  Entry refers to Investment in property plant and equipment.   
 
 A.5 Dependent variable is the logarithm of the range of firm values within decades 




 (0.071) *** 




0.57  803 
6.000 
(0.578)*** 
  -0.221 
(0.071)*** 




0.57  803 
5.958 
(0.569)*** 






0.57  803 
Note:  HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various 
data sources.  Entry refers to Investment in property plant and equipment.  Ln(L) is the 
logarithm of the number of employees. Sunk and L are the averages per firm over the decades. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors cluster corrected by industry.   
A6: Dependent variable is logarithm of the variance of firm values within decades 




 (0.142) *** 




0.57  803 
10.12 
(1.167)*** 
  -0.465 
(0.143)*** 




0.57  803 
10.026 
(1.148)*** 






0.57  803 
Note: HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various 
data sources.  Entry refers to Investment in property plant and equipment.  LnL is the logarithm 
of the number of employees. Sunk and L are the averages per firm over the decades. Numbers 
in parentheses are robust standard errors cluster corrected by industry.  
 Appendix B: Intertemporal number of firms  
Dependent variables: Logarithm of the Range of the Number of Active Firms  
Eq.  Ln(HW1)  Ln(IRB)  Ln(BEA)  Ln(K/L)  Ln(NewK/L)  Adj.R² 
1  0.466 
(0.223)** 
    0.144 
(0.249) 
  0.12 
2    0.479 
(0.22)**   
  0.136 
(0.248) 
  0.12 




  0.10 
4  0.468 
(0.223)** 
      0.137 
(0.245) 
0.12 
5    0.482 
(0.22)** 
    0.130 
(0.244) 
0.13 
6      0.405 
(0.23)* 
  0.161 
(0.257) 
0.010 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are White-Huber corrected root square errors. Ib=*∑ iPib]/Vb 
where i  indexes inputs in the industry, Vb denotes the value of shipments of the industry in 
1992.  IRb is the index using the revised depreciation rates. IRBEAb is the index using the BEA 
depreciation rates. K/L=Capital Expenditures/Employees, NewK/L= New Capital 
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